Electoral Laws and the Double Bind: Reassessing Democratic Legitimacy through Institutional Design

This article was submitted to the Journal of Democracy for their quarterly publication. It was rejected.

Abstract

Contemporary democracies rely on elections to express popular sovereignty, yet many electoral systems replicate the structure of a double bind: citizens must choose among options defined by political elites, while abstention carries no institutional effect. This article analyzes how electoral laws can unintentionally neutralize citizen agency through elite-controlled rulemaking, formulaic vote translation, and the depoliticization of non-participation. Drawing on democratic theory, historical precedents, and institutional design, it proposes reforms grounding legitimacy in citizen authority, meaningful abstention, and a Civic Assembly overseeing constitutional rules. The framework aims to strengthen representative democracy by restoring substantive democratic control.

Keywords

electoral law, democratic legitimacy, double bind, abstention, institutional design, civic assembly

The Double Bind of Electoral Democracy — A Structural Analysis

Introduction

Across contemporary democracies, public trust in representative institutions continues to erode. Declining turnout, rising volatility, anti-system voting, and widespread perceptions that elections no longer translate citizen preferences into meaningful political authority all point to a structural legitimacy deficit. While many explanations emphasize socioeconomic discontent or partisan polarization, this article argues that an important source of democratic malaise lies in the architecture of electoral laws themselves.

Electoral systems are often treated as neutral mechanisms of preference aggregation. Yet they are also structures of power: they shape how political authority is constituted, who may access it, and how citizens interact with institutions. Because electoral rules are written and revised by the same political actors who benefit from them, they incorporate unavoidable conflicts of interest, generating what this article terms a systemic double bind.

The double bind, adapted from Bateson’s communication theory, provides a useful lens for assessing the structural constraints embedded in electoral laws. In many democracies, citizens are simultaneously:

  1. Normatively pressured to participate in elections;
  2. Constrained to choose among options defined by political parties;
  3. Deprived of any consequence-bearing mechanism for abstention; and
  4. Excluded from altering the rules of representation themselves.

These four conditions reinforce one another, producing a situation in which elections offer choice without control, participation without authorship, and legitimacy without genuine authorization.

This article reframes these institutional tensions through a stronger causal argument than Version A. It contends that structural design—rather than civic disengagement or polarization—lies at the center of the legitimacy crisis. When citizens cannot influence the rules of representation, and when refusing to authorize representatives carries no institutional effect, the democratic claim of government “by the people” becomes difficult to sustain.

The analysis proceeds in six parts. Part 1 examines the double bind as an analytical framework for democratic design. Part 2 identifies features of electoral law that structurally constrain agency. Part 3 situates the problem historically. Part 4 critiques the juridical emptiness of authorization in current systems. Part 5 outlines reforms that would restore substantive citizen sovereignty. Part 6 proposes an institutional architecture—a Civic Assembly—to anchor democratic legitimacy.

The goal is not to discredit representative democracy but to strengthen its foundations. A democracy that grants citizens meaningful authority over representation rules, and meaningful ways to withhold consent, becomes not only more legitimate but more resilient.

1. The Double Bind as a Framework for Democratic Design

The concept of a double bind refers to a communicative situation in which an individual must choose among options that ultimately reinforce the authority of the entity imposing them, while refusal to choose carries no practical benefit.[1] While originally intended to explain dysfunctional interpersonal dynamics, the structure is highly relevant to political institutions.

In an electoral double bind, citizens face a similar structural configuration:

The result is a paradoxical situation: representation depends on consent, but the institutional design offers citizens no actionable means to withhold or condition that consent.

1.1. Formal choice without substantive agency

The distinction between formal and substantive choice is central. Formally, citizens can choose among candidates and parties. Substantively, however, they cannot influence:

Representative systems thus offer structured choice rather than genuine agency. Citizens participate in a process whose parameters have already been set by those they are asked to authorize.

1.2. Delegation without juridical grounding

Legitimacy requires a framework through which delegated authority can be traced, justified, and—when necessary—revoked. Yet in representative democracy, no such juridical mechanism exists. Citizens do not grant specific, accountable powers; instead, they confer broad discretion for fixed terms, with few institutional constraints between elections.

Pitkin’s classic account of representation emphasizes responsiveness and accountability.[2] Mansbridge highlights evolving, dynamic relationships between citizens and their representatives.[3] But without mechanisms that give institutional meaning to withholding consent—such as meaningful abstention or revocation procedures—authorization becomes an empty formality.

1.3. The psychological impact of constrained choice

When citizens perceive electoral participation as obligatory but ineffectual, frustration accumulates. Voting becomes a civic duty rather than a form of agency; abstention becomes apathy rather than political expression. This psychological pattern helps explain widespread alienation and the appeal of anti-system rhetoric.

In short, the double bind is not an abstract metaphor. It is a structural pattern that shapes how citizens interpret and experience democratic participation.

2. Electoral Law as a Mechanism of Structural Constraint

Electoral laws determine not only how votes are translated into seats but also how political authority is constituted. Because these laws are drafted by representatives with vested interests, they shape citizen options in predictable ways.

2.1. Elite authorship of electoral rules

In the overwhelming majority of democracies, electoral law is exclusively written, debated, amended, and approved by elected politicians. This arrangement grants political elites structural authority over:

The incentives are clear: elected officials design rules that sustain their own capacity to win office. This is not conspiracy; it is institutional logic. As Lijphart and others show, electoral systems tend to become self-preserving over time.[4]

2.2. The depoliticization of abstention

In most systems, abstention has no institutional effect. Whether turnout is 90% or 40%, the distribution of power remains identical. This design makes it impossible for citizens to express collective non-authorization.

The political meaning of abstention thus evaporates. Hirschman’s classic framework identifies exit as a crucial component of healthy systems.[5] Electoral designs that neutralize abstention deprive citizens of the ability to signal withdrawal of consent.

2.3. Mathematical transformations that limit agency

Electoral formulas inevitably transform individual preferences into collective outcomes. Whether majoritarian, proportional, or mixed, these formulas create structural incentives that advantage certain actors and minimize the influence of others.

While unavoidable, these mathematical transformations become problematic when:

These conditions together reinforce the electoral double bind.

3. Historical Context: The Long Shadow of Constituted Power

Electoral systems did not emerge from a neutral theoretical vacuum. They were crafted in specific historical contexts in which elites sought to balance popular sovereignty with institutional stability.

3.1. Foundational compromises

During the French Revolution, Sieyès articulated a foundational distinction between constituent power (the people) and constituted power (the institutions they create).[6] Yet the institutional frameworks he supported ultimately placed rulemaking authority in the hands of representatives rather than citizens.

In the American founding, Madison and others argued for filtration mechanisms intended to prevent majoritarian excess.[7] While understandable in context, these choices limited the direct influence citizens would have over electoral design.

3.2. The Weimar anomaly

The Weimar Republic remains one of the only cases where abstention meaningfully altered institutional structure: lower turnout resulted in fewer seats.[8] While Weimar failed for many reasons unrelated to electoral design, this precedent shows that alternative mechanisms are possible.

3.3. The contemporary legitimacy deficit

Today, declining trust in institutions is well-documented across advanced democracies.[9] While economic inequality, polarization, and cultural shifts play roles, the structural design of electoral systems—particularly the inability of citizens to influence foundational rules—contributes to a widespread sense that elections no longer convey meaningful political agency.

4. Authorization and the Limits of Electoral Legitimacy

Representative democracies often rely on elections to produce legitimacy. Yet legitimacy cannot be derived from procedure alone; it requires an institutional structure that allows citizens to meaningfully grant, withhold, and revoke authorization. Contemporary democracies fail to meet this standard.

4.1. The juridical vacuum of delegation

Delegation in democratic theory should entail clearly defined powers, constraints, and mechanisms for revocation. In representative government, none of these elements exists. Citizens are not asked to authorize specific powers, nor are they given mechanisms to withdraw authorization short of waiting for the next election—a delay that can span years.

This juridical vacuum reduces electoral authorization to a symbolic gesture rather than a functional transfer of power. As Pitkin argues, representation depends on a relationship of accountability and responsiveness,[10] but existing systems lack mechanisms to translate these principles into enforceable institutions.

4.2. The problem of presumed consent

Because abstention has no institutional effect, electoral systems presume consent even when it is absent. This presumption contradicts basic democratic norms. In any domain where authorization matters—law, medicine, governance—the absence of consent cannot be automatically interpreted as approval.

By treating non-participation as irrelevant, electoral systems effectively assume that only expressed preferences matter, while silence holds no meaning. From a democratic perspective, however, silence may be the most important signal of all: it may indicate dissatisfaction with the menu of options, frustration with the process, or rejection of the system itself.

4.3. Symbolic participation and democratic ritual

Elections fulfill a ritualistic role: they demonstrate that authority is renewed by the people. Yet ritual is not substance. When the act of voting does not meaningfully affect the authority delegated or the rules of representation, the symbolic gesture becomes disconnected from political reality.

This disconnection contributes to declining trust in institutions. Citizens sense that participation is required but not consequential. Voting becomes something that must be done rather than something that accomplishes anything. The symbolic veneer of democracy remains intact, but the substantive core weakens.

5. Toward Electoral Laws That Restore Agency and Legitimacy

If democratic systems are to regain their legitimacy, they must address the structural conditions that produce the electoral double bind. This requires institutional innovations that grant citizens genuine authority over the rules of representation and meaningful mechanisms for withholding consent.

5.1. Citizen sovereignty over electoral law

Restoring legitimacy begins with placing electoral rulemaking under citizen authority. This does not require abolishing representative institutions but rather complementing them with mechanisms ensuring that foundational rules cannot be self-servingly crafted by incumbents.

Possible institutional models include:

Any of these approaches would reduce conflicts of interest and reestablish the people as the ultimate source of authority.

5.2. Reintroducing political meaning to abstention

If abstention is to serve as a form of political expression, it must carry institutional consequences. Several options are viable:

These mechanisms would transform abstention from silence into a structured form of political communication.

5.3. Citizen control over final decision-making

Beyond authority over electoral law, citizens require institutional mechanisms for exerting final control over political outcomes, particularly executive formation. These include:

These reforms ensure that citizens remain politically active participants rather than passive delegators.

6. The Civic Assembly: An Institutional Anchor for Democratic Legitimacy

Electoral laws are too important to be left solely to those who benefit from them. What is needed is a stable constitutional institution that protects the people’s constituent authority and prevents the political class from regulating its own power without oversight.

6.1. Purpose and competence

A Civic Assembly would serve as a fourth constitutional power charged with:

  1. Ensuring that electoral rules reflect democratic principles;
  2. Approving or rejecting rule changes proposed by legislators;
  3. Initiating constitutional reforms when necessary;
  4. Serving as an impartial adjudicator in conflicts of interest involving political actors.

Its jurisdiction would be limited to foundational questions to prevent interference with policy and legislative activity.

6.2. Composition and legitimacy

While the structure may vary, most proposals envision a body composed of randomly selected citizens supported by expert advisors. This model builds on successful precedents in Ireland, Canada, and France, demonstrating that ordinary citizens, when properly supported, can deliberate effectively on complex constitutional issues.[16]

6.3. Avoiding self-dealing by political elites

The core justification for a Civic Assembly lies in the problem of institutional self-dealing. Representatives cannot impartially regulate the rules that govern their own power. As Ackerman and Lijphart have shown, democratic systems require neutral mechanisms to constrain such conflicts of interest.[13]

A Civic Assembly provides precisely this safeguard.

7. Addressing Common Objections

Any effort to reform electoral law or introduce mechanisms of citizen oversight confronts predictable objections. These objections often assume the inevitability or desirability of current structures. Yet most collapse under scrutiny once the institutional logic of the double bind is understood.

7.1. “If people want change, they can form a new party.”

This argument presumes a degree of openness in electoral systems that rarely exists. Comparative research shows that once institutional arrangements are in place, they tend to entrench incumbents.[15] Thresholds, public-financing formulas, ballot-access rules, and media structures all disproportionately benefit established actors.

New parties may challenge policy directions, but they seldom succeed in altering foundational rules—because those rules are controlled by the very actors who stand to lose power if the rules change. Thus, the “form a new party” objection misunderstands the structural barriers embedded in representative systems.

7.2. “Citizens lack the competence to shape electoral rules.”

The empirical record contradicts this assumption. Deliberative democratic experiments—from the Irish Constitutional Convention to British Columbia’s Citizens’ Assembly—demonstrate that ordinary citizens, when provided with balanced information and structured deliberation, perform well in complex decision-making tasks.[16]

Moreover, civic competence is not a fixed attribute; it is shaped by the very institutions that enable or suppress political engagement. Systems that exclude citizens from consequential decision-making gradually erode civic motivation and knowledge.[17] Restoring citizen authority helps restore the habits of citizenship itself.

7.3. “Expanding citizen oversight risks populism or instability.”

This objection implicitly treats stability as something preserved by restricting democratic agency. Yet democracies with robust citizen mechanisms—Switzerland, Uruguay, U.S. states with initiative processes—tend to exhibit high levels of institutional resilience.[19]

Instability arises not from citizen influence but from democratic systems that lose credibility. Restoring agency strengthens stability; suppressing it invites backlash.

7.4. “Representation is already democratic—additional institutions are unnecessary.”

Representation can be democratic, but only when the people retain control over the structures that define representation. As Manin and Urbinati observe, representative democracy is legitimate only when it institutionalizes channels for public influence over rulemaking.[18]

When citizens lack such channels, representation becomes self-referential: institutions authorize themselves through procedures that citizens cannot alter. The Civic Assembly proposed here addresses precisely this structural deficiency.

8. A Democratic Path Forward

Reforming electoral systems is politically difficult, but institutional redesign can emerge from citizen-led processes. The pathway need not be revolutionary; it can be incremental, precise, and constitutionally grounded.

8.1. Citizen constitutional initiatives

Citizen assemblies can draft models of electoral reform, disseminate them through civil society, and press for institutional recognition. These bodies do not need to hold formal power to shape political discourse; legitimacy grows from reasoned deliberation, public visibility, and moral authority.

8.2. Gradual but decisive reforms

Possible incremental reforms include:

Even partial reforms enhance legitimacy by signaling that electoral rules belong to the public, not to incumbents.

8.3. Constitutional anchoring of constituent power

Ultimately, democratic stability requires embedding citizen authority at the level of constitutional design. A permanent Civic Assembly—separate from partisan conflict—provides such anchoring. Its purpose is minimal but essential: safeguarding the boundary between constituent and constituted power.

Conclusion: Beyond Structural Double Binds

Modern democracies face a profound legitimacy challenge. Elections are still held, governments still rotate, and institutions still function. Yet citizens increasingly doubt that their participation has real consequence. This article has argued that such doubts stem not merely from disillusionment or polarization but from the structural design of electoral law itself.

By applying the double-bind framework to electoral systems, we see how citizens are pressured to participate, constrained in their choices, unable to give political meaning to abstention, and excluded from revising the rules that govern representation. Under these conditions, formal choice persists while substantive agency erodes.

Democratic renewal requires:

  1. Citizen authority over electoral law,
  2. Institutional consequences for abstention,
  3. Mechanisms of final control by citizens, and
  4. A Civic Assembly to protect constituent power.

These reforms do not undermine representative democracy—they secure its foundations. A democracy in which citizens can authorize, withhold, and revoke power is one that moves beyond structural double binds and toward genuine political self-government.

Endnotes (Chicago Style, EN1)

  1. Gregory Bateson et al., “Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia,” Behavioral Science 1, no. 4 (1956): 251–264.
  2. Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
  3. Jane Mansbridge, “Rethinking Representation,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (2003): 515–528.
  4. Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
  5. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
  6. Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès, What Is the Third Estate? (1789).
  7. James Madison, Federalist Papers, Nos. 10 and 51 (1787–88).
  8. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), 144–145.
  9. Pippa Norris, Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
  10. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation.
  11. Mansbridge, “Rethinking Representation.”
  12. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.
  13. Bruce Ackerman, We the People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
  14. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748).
  15. Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
  16. James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
  17. Russell J. Dalton, The Good Citizen (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008).
  18. Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
  19. David Altman, Direct Democracy Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Author Biography

Demostopheles is an independent scholar of representative democracy, researching electoral structures since 2012. He authored the 2017 booklet “Voters’ Guide” and is completing “Autopsy of Representative Democracy” and “A modest proposal to Humanity.” Email: demostopheles@democraticus.org